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ABSTRACT
Carlo Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric (1910) is one of the best examples of what
Massimo Cacciari calls the early twentieth century “metaphysics of youth.” Persuasion and
Rhetoric is the result of Michelstaedter’s academic investigation on the concepts of “persuasion”
and “rhetoric” in Plato and Aristotle. Michelstaedter saw in Plato’s corpus the gradual
abandonment of Parmenidean “being” and Socrates’ dialogical philosophy. He reinterpreted the
notions of “persuasion” and “rhetoric” as terms of a radical dichotomy, using them to represent
two opposed ontological modalities, epistemological attitudes, and existential alternatives. If
“rhetoric” comprehends language, institutional knowledge, and all manifestations of empirical
life, then “persuasion” is defined as the unity of the individual with Parmenidean being.
Persuasion is an impossible choice: “lifeless life.” Being a decisive alternative to rhetoric,
persuasion – much like Platonic mania – can neither be articulated nor communicated.
Nevertheless, Michelstaedter speaks, aware of his inevitable failure: he will not persuade anyone.
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1

INTRODUCTION

The present work is indebted to Massimo Cacciari’s studies on Michelstaedter and some
Middle-European1 thinkers who were his contemporaries. Cacciari’s essays – La lotta ‘su’
Platone (The War ‘on’ Plato), Interpretazione di Michelstaedter (Interpretation of
Michelstaedter), and Metafisica della Gioventù (Metaphysics of Youth) – constitute the main
inspiration for my investigations on Carlo Michelstaedter.
The object of my thesis is to describe, analyze, and contextualize Carlo Michelstaedter’s
1910 work, Persuasion and Rhetoric (La Persuasion e la Rettorica), the result of
Michelstaedter’s academic investigation of Plato and Aristotle. In order to contextualize
Persuasion and Rhetoric, I will relate it to other two philosophical works of roughly the same
period: György Lukács’ Soul and Form (1910); and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (1922). According to Massimo Cacciari, Persuasion and Rhetoric represents the
acme of all Middle-European intellectual culture of the decade that anticipated World War I;
Cacciari calls it “the generation of the 80’s.” Despite some undeniable differences in content,
form, and methodology, many intellectuals working in this period share the same “enthusiasm
(in its ontological meaning) of youth, genial loneliness … and sore disenchantment,
abandonment and renunciation of the soberest and most lucid old age.”2 All these works
privilege the archetype of the modern “metaphysics of youth”3 which, according to Cacciari, is
implicit in the “Wille” of Schopenhauer; they are also linked by a common ethos that denies any
All translations from Italian are mine, with the exception of: Carlo Michelstaedter, Persuasion and Rhetoric, trans.
Russell Scott Valentino, Cinzia Sartini Blum, and David J. Depew, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
1
See my discussion at page 8.
2
Cacciari, Interpretazione di Michelstaedter, 21.
3
“Metaphysics of Youth” is the title of an essay by Walter Benjamin (1913-14). Cacciari also used the title,
“Metaphysics of Youth,” for his foreword to György Lukács. Diario (1910-1911).
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moral and ontological compromise, or any mediating theory such as the Aristotelian mesotes
formula. In these works, “irreducible choices” are presented. Cacciari believes that three books
emerged in this period as representative of what he calls “extreme works” (opere limite):
Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric; Lukács’ Soul and Form; and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. These authors, who all have Jewish origins, share the same rejection of
“aesthetic culture.” In Michelstaedter’s and Lukács’ terms, aesthetic culture is bound to
relativism and impressionism, since the aesthetic type bases truth on his or her sensory
impressions, and depends on them for making judgments of an ethical nature. We may say, along
with Cacciari, that in Persuasion and Rhetoric, Soul and Form, and Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, the same need for truth appears, and the same necessity to individualize the
appropriate locus for the truth to reveal itself: “a deep pathos for truth, and a sense of absolute
responsibility for thinking and writing link, in this respect, Lukács, Michelstaedter, and
Wittgenstein.”4
Lukács and Michelstaedter locate the truth in some notion of “idea,” and both Persuasion
and Rhetoric and Soul and Form aim to “save” the Platonic “Idea” from its mundane corruption;
nevertheless, their strategies move in two opposite directions. Lukács chooses the Symposium as
his Platonic reference-point, and sees the essay’s “form” as the place where the Platonic idea can
reveal itself. According to Cacciari, Lukács understands the essay as an ethical5 form of nonsystematic modern dialectic: the essay possesses the idea by showing its distance from it; the
essay fosters the truth insofar as it shows it, but does not contain it. This constitutes the essay’s

4

Cacciari, Interpretazione di Michelstaedter, 23.
“Form is the highest judge of life. Form-giving is a judging force, an ethic; there is a value-judgment in everything
that has been given form. Every kind of form-giving, every literary form, is a step in the hierarchy of lifepossibilities: the all-decisive word has been spoken about a man and his fate when the decision is taken as to the
form which his life-manifestations can assume and which the highest moments of his life demand.” Lukács, Soul
and Form, 173, emphasis mine.
5
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dialectical power: the essay comprehends the idea, and at the same time it does not; it
comprehends it providing a sign, but it does not insofar as it cannot encompass it. By contrast,
Michelstaedter chooses the Apology and Gorgias as his constructive Platonic sources, and, even
if he tells us that the Idea – and the truth – can only emerge through Socratic negative dialectic,
his work seems to suggest that “reaching the truth” – what he calls “persuasion” – is a form of
divination, much like what Plato calls mania.6 Michelstaedter’s philosophy is essentially
opposed to any “discursive” form: the truth needs to be possessed, and possessing the truth is
precisely being persuaded; but truth and persuasion can neither be articulated nor communicated.
In this respect Michelstaedter would not agree with Lukács’ position, since the “essay” is
“continuous interpretation,” and thus it can never possess the Idea and the truth. Persuasion and
Rhetoric thus presents us with a thought that is aporetic: persuasion is beyond the rhetoric of
language, and cannot be communicated. Nevertheless, Michelstaedter endeavors to speak of it,
and in this way persuasion becomes rhetoric. As we will see, in many passages of Persuasion
and Rhetoric, Michelstaedter says that “persuasion” is “solitude” and “silence,” and yet he tries
to articulate “persuasion” through his rhetoric.
This proposed distance between language and life, as well as the image of “silence,” are
what link Michelstaedter to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Proposition no. 7 of
the Tractatus says: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”7; Wittgenstein
claims that it is impossible to express meaning outside the boundaries of propositional language,
yet the fundamental human problems cannot be solved within the limits of language.
Michelstaedter shares this opinion, and yet he tries to escape from rhetoric. “To the ascetic

6

See Phaedrus 244a-245c. As I will discuss later, Michelstaedter sees in the Phaedrus the first signs of Plato’s
abandonment of Socratic philosophy. Nonetheless, this dialogue influenced Michelstaedter positively. Moreover, the
Phaedrus belongs to the same period as the Symposium, which is Lukács’ Platonic reference-point.
7
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 89.
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honesty of Wittgenstein is opposed the tragic dishonesty of Michelstaedter.”8 Even if the
Tractatus leaves the reader with silence, and Persuasion and Rhetoric with an impossible saying,
Cacciari believes that in Wittgenstein’s silence we can hear an aspiration similar to the
“desperate attempt to say” in Michelstaedter’s work.
Since Michelstaedter is in constant dialogue with Plato, contextualizing Persuasion and
Rhetoric also involves relating it to certain important Platonic texts. For this reason, I will relate
Persuasion and Rhetoric to the philosophy of Plato – or rather, Michelstaedter’s interpretation of
Plato – and, in the Conclusion, I will offer a brief comparison between Persuasion and Rhetoric
and the Gorgias, which represents, along with the Apology, a fundamental influence on
Michelstaedter’s views. In my work, I do not want to offer a one-way reading of
Michelstaedter’s philosophy; by this I mean that I do not want to interpret Persuasion and
Rhetoric as a mere product of a pre-World War I Zeitgeist, or to present it as a completely
revolutionary work. I believe that among Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric, Lukács’
Soul and Form, and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, there are “family
resemblances.”9 For example, it is indubitable that in Persuasion and Rhetoric and Soul and
Form something is “decided” in relation to Platonic philosophy, and that in both
Michelstaedter’s and Wittgenstein’s frameworks “truth” and “saying” are related. In relation to
Plato, we can say that Persuasion and Rhetoric and the Gorgias fight the same battle against
Sophistry, but also that in his work Michelstaedter commits a Platonic “parricide.” In this
respect, in relation to Platonic philosophy and Middle-European intellectual culture, Persuasion

8

Cacciari, Interpretazione di Michelstaedter, 30.
The notion of “family resemblance” derives from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. In this context, I
reinterpret this Wittgensteinean notion, in order to show that the works I mentioned are related by similarities, but
cannot be reduced to a common ultimate “essence.”

9
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and Rhetoric stands as an original work. As Lukács says, “[l]et any resemblance serve here
merely as a background against which the differences stand out more sharply.”10
It is important to notice that reconstructing Michelstaedter’s thought entails several
hermeneutical problems. Persuasion and Rhetoric is an extremely complicated text; in the
introduction to the English edition we read:
[T]he most remarkable feature of Michelstaedter’s style is its complexity.… Michelstaedter’s
writing is expressionistically “dissonant.” True to the content of his work, Michelstaedter
disavows any intention of “persuading” or “diverting” his readers, as well as any claim to
originality, “philosophical dignity,” or “artistic concreteness.” An ironic interpretation of such a
paradoxical statement of (lack of) purpose is possible: we can read it as a rhetorical strategy
(acutum dicendi genus) intended to produce an effect of estrangement, which makes the reader
step outside established patterns of thought (the vie, ‘ways’ or ‘paths,’ of which Michelstaedter
writes at numerous points.) This defamiliarizing effect, which can plausibly be ascribed to
Heraclitus or Parmenides as no less intentional, is instrumental to the goal of persuasion as
Michelstaedter conceives it. The quest for persuasion requires, as also for the Greek authors he
prefers, a break with the normal world, the world Parmenides calls “the way of seeming.”…
In view of the authors’ attachment to poetic and paradoxical thinkers, as well as his
refusal in writing his dissertation to obey the conventions of academic prose, … it is not surprising
that his style would pose great difficulties for readers. Campailla notes that from an editor’s
standpoint Michelstaedter’s punctuation is a “veritable via crucis.” (PR, xxiv-xxv, notes omitted)

Moreover, Persuasion and Rhetoric often presents theses that seem to be in contradiction with
one another. My intention is to lead the reader through Michelstaedter’s argument, try to explain
some of its contradictions, all the while being aware that this will not always be possible. On the
one hand, Michelstaedter defines persuasion and rhetoric as antithetical concepts, in terms of a
radical dichotomy; on the other hand, he points to the possibility of persuasion in the world,
which, in his terms, is rhetorically constituted.
My thesis will develop through the following stages: I will first introduce Carlo
Michelstaedter as an historical and intellectual figure, and then I will analyze his main work,
Persuasion and Rhetoric; this latter task will constitute the main part of my thesis. The first
chapter will be divided in two sections: “On Persuasion,” and “On Rhetoric.” In the second
10

Lukács, Soul and Form, 2.

6
chapter, I will discuss Persuasion and Rhetoric’s relationship to the philosophy of Socrates and
Plato, who are extremely important influences on Michelstaedter’s views. In the third and final
chapter, I will relate Michelstaedter’s work to György Lukács’ Soul and Form, and Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; this abbreviated final chapter will help to
elucidate the similarities between Michelstaedter and some of his contemporaries, as well as
what constitutes the distinctive qualities of his thought. In the Conclusion, “Dialectic, Aporia,
and Parmenidean Being,” I will return to the aporetic level of Michelstaedter’s discourse, and its
problematic relation to Parmenidean thought.

7
CHAPTER ONE: CARLO MICHELSTAEDTER: PERSUASION AND RHETORIC

I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting
it in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction
in the subject itself or a close companionship, when suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated
in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining.
Besides, this at any rate I know, that if there were to be a treatise or a lecture on this subject, I could do it
best. I am also sure for that matter that I should be very sorry to see such a treatise poorly written. If I thought it
possible to deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a lecture for the general public, what finer achievement
would there have been in my life than to write a work of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of things to
light for all men? I do not, however, think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing, except in the
case of some few who are capable of discovering the truth for themselves with a little guidance.
-Plato, Seventh Letter 341 c-e.

I know I am talking because I’m talking, but I also know I shall not persuade anyone, and this is dishonesty; but
rhetoric αναγκάζει µε ταυτα δραν βία, ‘forcibly compels me to do things’; in other words, “if you bite into a
crabapple, you’ve got to spit it out.”
-Carlo Michelstaedter, PR, 4.

The youngest of four children, Carlo Michelstaedter was born into a Jewish family in
Gorizia (now part of Italy) on June 3, 1887. He died by his own hand on October 17, 1910, at age
23.11 Gorizia, located in the north-east of Italy – the region is now called Friuli Venezia Giulia –
was then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. I will first discuss Michelstaedter’s intellectual
formation, and then turn to an explication of his most influential text.
Michelstaedter’s body of literary works (Persuasion and Rhetoric, The Dialogue of
Health, Poems, and Epistolario)12 is dominated by a relentless attack on institutional knowledge

11

The possible reasons for Michelstaedter’s suicide have been discussed in several essays and books. Some authors
consider his suicide as metaphysically consistent with his thought. Some others deny this possibility. In my thesis I
do not intend to discuss this issue, since it has often prevented Michelstaedter from being considered only for his
philosophy.
12
Persuasion and Rhetoric is considered Michelstaedter’s main philosophical work. Nevertheless his corpus
consists of several poems, writings, letters, drawings and paintings. The collection of his original works is held at
the Carlo Michelstaedter Foundation – Fondo Carlo Michelstaedter – in Gorizia, Italy. Besides Persuasion and
Rhetoric, Adelphi Editions has published: Poesie (1987), a collection of poems; Il Dialogo della Salute e Altri
Dialoghi, (1988), a collection of fictional dialogues in a Platonic-Leopardian vein; and Epistolario (1983), a
selection among Michelstaedter’s personal correspondence.
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and systematic thought, for example, the philosophy of Hegel. Michelstaedter interpreted Plato’s
corpus as divided in two parts: “young” works and “old” dialogues, respectively.13 He
considered the philosophy of the “old” Plato also as systematic, and he criticized him precisely
for this change. These intellectual attitudes made Michelstaedter an “untimely” Italian figure, for
in the Italy of late 1800’s /early 1900’s the dominant philosophical position was neo-idealism,
especially that of Benedetto Croce. Idealism’s dominance and popularity also prevented
Michelstaedter from being considered as a philosopher by many of his contemporaries; in 1922
Giovanni Gentile reviewed Persuasion and Rhetoric in the journal La Critica, and he criticized
Michelstaedter precisely for his lack of systematicity. For this reason Michelstaedter needs to be
considered in relation to Middle-European intellectual culture, and not just in relation to Italian
philosophy and letters. “Middle-European intellectual culture” is a very broad, and perhaps
overly general, term; I am here referring to intellectual movements and tendencies of central
European culture in the early twentieth century. In this period, intellectuals from a variety of
disciplines were investigating similar problems with similar attitudes. I consider Vienna to be the
inner capital of Middle-Europe, as I present it here; I would also include in what I am calling
“Middle-European Culture” figures such as Sigmund Freud, Arthur Schnitzler, Robert Musil,
13

It is important to notice that Michelstaedter does not offer an analytic reconstruction of the Platonic dialogues’
chronology. He recognizes examples of what he calls “persuasion” in the Apology and the Gorgias. Michelstaedter’s
understanding of the chronology of Plato’s corpus emerges in his Critical Appendices, which follow Persuasion and
Rhetoric in an Italian edition published by Adelphi. I will refer to them with the abbreviation AC, followed by the
page number. Michelstaedter cites the Crito, the Protagoras, and the Symposium as both “serious” and “playful”
works; “when Plato was serious, then he played” (AC, 194). The Phaedrus may be considered, in Michelstaedter’s
view, as a transitional dialogue: this work, which is still playful, shows that Plato abandoned Socratic teachings: he
considered his own method, and offered an apology for it. In this way, Plato opted for a “rhetorical” philosophy.
According to Michelstaedter, the Republic represents the first dialogue in which Plato attempts to organize society in
“rhetorical” terms. Here, the society that Plato depicts is founded on the irrational logic of needs. Michelstaedter
says that in the Republic Plato identified “the principle of lack as the substantial principle” and “the irrationality of
our necessity as the principle of reason” (AC, 146). This “rhetorical” thought reached its most highly developed
articulation in what Michelstaedter sees as “dialectic-systematic” dialogues, such as the Parmenides and the Sophist.
Michelstaedter recognizes in these two dialogues the “decadence” of Platonic philosophy. In the Parmenides and the
Sophist “to on (being)” dies, and, through the introduction of “to heteron (the different),” philosophical honesty
disappears forever (AC, 181).
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and George Trakl. Michelstaedter’s thought also develops and takes shape alongside the work of
intellectuals such as György Lukács, Georg Simmel, Otto Weinenger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
To support this idea, Thomas J. Harrison sees Michelstaedter as an exponent of European
Expressionism,14 and, as we have already seen, Massimo Cacciari considers Persuasion and
Rhetoric to be a book that shares the same ethos as Lukács’ and Wittgenstein’s early works.
Persuasion and Rhetoric is an investigation based upon a fundamental dichotomy:
“persuasion” versus “rhetoric.” This dichotomy is understood by Michelstaedter in ontological
terms, and since his ontology is based on Parmenides’ conception of “being,” the dichotomy may
also be read as: “being” versus “not-being,” or “being” versus “lack-of-being.” Parmenidean
“being” is, has been, and always will be, one and unchangeable. By contrast, this world – which
appears, and thus exists – is constituted by a multitude of determinations and by constant
movement and becoming. Therefore, this world differs from Parmenidean being, and in differing
from it, it lacks such being. But how can any worldly determination be if it lacks being? I would
say that any determination is (exists) to the extent that its existence is contradictory. This
constitutes the primary ontological aporia that will present itself throughout Persuasion and
Rhetoric: every living thing exists, and yet it is separated from being, and thus it lacks being.
We may say that the world of determinations is the result of a misunderstanding of Parmenides’
being: it is Heraclitus’s realm of permanent becoming.15 If the dichotomy “persuasion” versus
“rhetoric” was introduced in Parmenidean terms as “being” versus “lack-of-being,” then this idea
may be re-formulated as “Parmenidean being” versus “Heraclitean becoming.” As Daniela Bini

14

This is one of the main theses of Harrison’s 1910.
“Because at no point is the will satisfied, each thing destroys itself in coming into being and in passing away:
πάντα ρει, ‘everything flows’” (PR, 15, note omitted).
15
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says, “Michelstaedter was a ‘Parmenidean’ insofar as he was ‘Heraclitean’; that is, he needed to
believe in an immutable being because he was trapped in the world of becoming.”16
Persuasion realizes the Parmenidean identity of being and thought. When men live
rhetorically, they are separated from Parmenidean being, insofar they relate themselves to the
determinations and make use of the “availability” of beings.17 On the other hand, persuasion
means to be one with the totality, to be the totality. It is in relation to this point that
Michelstaedter shows an enormous distance from Plato’s dialectic: it seems that any type of
dialectical synthesis is not possible in his framework.
Michelstaedter’s conception of “persuasion” and “rhetoric” derives from a peculiar
understanding of Plato’s thought, and more particularly the Socratic philosophy described by
Plato. In my previous thesis18 I focused precisely on this ambiguous relation between
Michelstaedter and Plato. Indeed, I claim the relation to be ambiguous due to the fact that Plato
is Michelstaedter’s main polemical target in the passages of Persuasion and Rhetoric that are
dedicated to the critique of Rhetoric as “knowledge.” Nevertheless, Michelstaedter’s constructive
thought is still influenced by Platonic philosophy. We might even claim that Michelstaedter is
presenting a Platonic critique of Platonism. On the one hand, Michelstaedter’s ontology and his
conception of human modality of existence, which has persuasion and rhetoric as its extremes,
are based on Parmenides’ thought; on the other hand, they develop alongside the philosophical
works of Plato. Besides Parmenides, for the reasons I have discussed, Plato is the author with

16

Bini, Carlo Michelstaedter and the Failure of Language, 22. Bini says that Michelstaedter needed to believe in an
immutable being, because, in my opinion, Michelstaedter could not accept the logical contradiction of becoming in
the world.
17
“It is the knowledge of the thing’s perpetual flow what teaches us to make use of things in the moment that does
not come back.” Michelstaedter, Il Dialogo della Salute, 48.
18
Massimiliano Moschetta, Carlo Michelstaedter Lettore di Platone: la Persuasione e la Rettorica.
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whom Michelstaedter – explicitly or implicitly – is in constant dialogue, and Platonic thought is
always lying behind Persuasion and Rhetoric’s pages.
“The concepts of Persuasion and Rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle” is the subject of
Michelstaedter’s university dissertation (tesi di laurea) at the Istituto di Studi Superiori in
Florence, Italy. His thesis director was Girolamo Vitelli, professor of ancient Greek literature,
and “heir to the most technical philological tradition then in fashion in Germany”19 The original
thesis project would later serve as mere appendices to Persuasion and Rhetoric, and it is in them
that we find the genealogy of the concept of “rhetoric,” understood by Michelstaedter as
(decadent) philosophical knowledge. In Persuasion and Rhetoric, the traditional Greek concept
is subject to a transformation; its meaning becomes so wide that it comprehends the totality of
human behavior, the essence of language, and the foundations of any philosophical system.20
Michelstaedter’s attention to the distinction between “rhetoric” and “persuasion” began
early in his academic career, and it developed out of his broader philological interests. In this
regard we should note a telling comment from a letter to his father (dated May 31, 1908), where
Michelstaedter describes a philology exercise based upon Cicero’s oration Pro Q. Ligario:
“These are not my kind of works…. The only things that got my attention are the observations I
could make on eloquence and ‘persuasion’ in general.”21 Michelstaedter decided to focus on the
concepts of “persuasion” and “rhetoric” for many different reasons. As the scholar Gianfranco
Gianotti says, Michelstaedter was interested in the dichotomy of persuasion/rhetoric because,
under the influence of Parmenides, he started to interpret it as an expression of the irreducible
19

Gianotti, Carlo Michelstaedter tra “Persuasione” e “Rettorica,” 172.
“Rhetoric” replaces “persuasion” when “[t]he criterion is no longer the ειναι (being), rather the αποδεικνύναι
(demonstration) and the ’αποϕάναι (declaration)” (AC, 176). Michelstaedter claims that with rhetoric we have lost
being, since we “συµπλέκωµεν (link) and κατηγορωµεν (demonstrate)” instead (AC, 178). Philosophical
argumentation, logical syllogism, demonstration are all expressions of rhetoric, because in “saying is already
implicit movement” (AC, 178).
21
Michelstaedter, Epistolario, 321.
20
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antithesis of appearance and reality. Following in the Platonic as well as the Romantic-Decadent
tradition, he understood “rhetoric” as a web of discourses indifferent to the “truth”; he
consequently promoted the concept of “persuasion” to a higher onto-epistemological level. Far
from being a mere function of rhetoric (as it was understood to be in the Classical tradition),
persuasion was elevated to the “certainty of being” prior to any falsifying linguistic
architecture.22 Since Michelstaedter’s ontology is based on the Parmenidean unity of being and
thought, and thus on the unity of ontology and epistemology, he interpreted the dichotomy
“persuasion” versus “rhetoric” first as an ontological split (“being” versus “appearance”), and
then as an epistemological dualism (“certainty of being” versus “opinion”). Thus, in
Michelstaedter’s work, persuasion and rhetoric are detached from their original Classical
(philological and linguistic) environment, and used to represent two opposed ontological
modalities, two epistemological attitudes, and two existential alternatives.
At this point, it is clear that the original analysis of the concepts of “persuasion” and
“rhetoric” in Plato and Aristotle was the pretext that would lead Michelstaedter eventually to
write Persuasion and Rhetoric. I say “Pretext” because 1) it represents the occasion for the
author to express his radical Weltanschauung, and 2) it anticipates the critical appendices, which
ironically constituted the original dissertation project.23
Persuasion and Rhetoric is structured in two parts: On Persuasion (Della Persuasione),
and On Rhetoric (Della Rettorica). Each part consists of three chapters:

22
23

See Gianotti, Carlo Michelstaedter tra “Persuasione” e “Rettorica,” 177.
The Critical Appendices are as follows:
1. I modi della significazione; “On the modes of signification.”
2. Note alla triste istoria che viene narrate a pag 66 e sgg; “Notes on the sad story narrated at page 66ff.”
3. Proiezione della mente di Aristotele sui modi della significazione; “Projection of Aristotle’s mind onto the
modes of signification.”
4. Della composizione della Rettorica di Aristotele; “On the composition of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.”
5. La Rettorica di Aristotele e il Fedro di Platone; “Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Plato’s Phaedrus.”
6. Della dialettica e della rettorica. “On Dialectics and Rhetoric.”
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1. Part I: On Persuasion.
•

Persuasion

•

The Illusion of Persuasion

•

The Way to Persuasion

2. Part II: On Rhetoric.
•

Rhetoric

•

The Constitution of Rhetoric

•

Rhetoric in Life

I would now like to offer a brief recapitulation of Michelstaedter’s radical proposal. It is
interesting to note that the description of persuasion is the content of the first part, while the
analysis (theoretical and phenomenological) of rhetoric constitutes the second. Persuasion and
Rhetoric’s structural outline shows us how, for Michelstaedter, being in itself is ontologically
prior to its worldly manifestations, and certainty of being is prior to “mortals’ opinions.”
Persuasion is thus onto-logically24 prior to rhetoric.
In the preface to Persuasion and Rhetoric, Michelstaedter claims that he does not pretend
to say anything new; his words have already been said many times – by Parmenides, Heraclitus,
Empedocles, Socrates, Ecclesiastes, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Simonides, Petrarch, Leopardi, Ibsen,
and Beethoven:
Yet insofar as everything I am saying has been said many times before and with great force, it
seems impossible that the world has continued each time such words have rung out.
Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles told it to the Greeks, but Aristotle treated them
as untutored naturalists; Socrates said it, but they constructed four systems on him. Ecclesiastes
said it, but they dealt with it as a sacred book that could not therefore contradict biblical optimism;
Christ said it, but they built the church upon it. Aeschylus and Sophocles and Simonides said it,
and Petrarch proclaimed it triumphantly to the Italians, while Leopardi repeated it with pain. But
24

I used the term “onto-logical,” with “onto” and “logical” linked by the hyphen, in order to represent graphically
the link between being and logos. For Michelstaedter, as a follower of Parmenides, logos and being are one:
“because the same thing is there for thinking and for being.” Parmenides of Elea, 57.
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men were pleased by their pretty verses and made of them literary types. If in our time the
creatures of Ibsen bring it to life in every scene, men “amuse themselves” by hearing those
“exceptional” stories among all the others, and the critics speak of “symbolism”; and if Beethoven
sings it so as to move the heart, then everyone turns such emotion to his own ends, making it, in
the end, a question of counterpoint. (PR, 4, notes omitted)

These thinkers are what we might consider Michelstaedter’s explicit influences; besides these,
who are explicitly mentioned, Persuasion and Rhetoric’s main implicit reference is
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (1818, Second Ed. 1844). We can say
that this is the clearest and most evident of his uncited influences. But I do not want to interpret
Michelstaedter’s work as a mere transposition of Schopenhauer’s Wille into an existential
framework. Both La Rocca and Cacciari are clear about the mistake that such an interpretation
would entail. In Michelstaedter’s framework, the will cannot be the noumenon of the world. Life
is indeed contradictory, but not because the will is that to which all manifestations in reality can
ultimately be reduced. Rather, the will is in itself essentially contradictory: life, in the rhetorical
world, constantly propagates through time and can never arrive upon itself. Persuaded life, on the
other hand, is self-sufficiency and consistency; this is the reason why Michelstaedter defines the
latter as abios bios: “lifeless life.”25 Unlike Schopenhauer, Michelstaedter does not see the will
as the inner motor of the world nor as the ultimate drive for all living forms. Instead, he
interprets the will as lack. So will’s character is essentially relational: everything is un esser-per,
a being-for. In Schopenhauer, the will is prior to the intellect; for Michelstaedter, by contrast,
will and consciousness are the same: “Determinacy is an attribution of value: consciousness”
(PR, 15). Michelstaedter reads Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the world also in terms of justice
and injustice. He claims: “Alle haben recht – niemand ist gerecht: ‘Everyone is right – no one
has the right’” (PR, 46). Any fact, any happening in the world, takes place with a reason, a right,

25

“In the άβιος βίος, ‘lifeless life,’ potency and act are one and the same, for… persuasion [ ] denies time and the
will in every deficient moment” (PR, 16).
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which is Schopenhauer’s logic of needs and will that he interprets through the relation of causeand-effect. Everything that happens, happens for a reason (the cause-and-effect dynamic), but
not with justice.26 According to Michelstaedter, there is no possibility of justice in the rhetorical
world, since justice is relative to each particular individual, and therefore “just” always means
“just for someone.” Michelstaedter’s critique attacks the ontological basis of the “social” world,
and in Persuasion and Rhetoric, priority is given to individuals, since any social institution is by
definition an expression of rhetoric, not persuasion. Michelstaedter believes that in the rhetorical
world any individual’s affirmation is irrational and violent, and thus it necessarily collides with
other individuals’ affirmations. The “just man” has justice; he lives outside time’s flow and
outside what in the Appendices Michelstaedter calls “kolakeia,” that rhetorical “gathering
together” of pernicious people.

On Persuasion
In the first pages of his work, Michelstaedter defines the persuaded person as the one
who is for himself and does not need anything else in order to be: “He who is for himself (µένει)
has no need of what would be for him (µένοι αυτόν) in a future time but instead possesses27 all
within himself” (PR, 10). Michelstaedter identifies “Being” with “substantiality.” Classical
metaphysics understands substance to be “what stands for itself,” and “what does not need
anything else in order to be”. Since all the entities in the world are essentially relational, they are
also non-substantial; lacking substance, they also lack being. According to Michelstaedter, then,
all the entities that humans interpret as substances, are only momentary abstractions from the
26

I think that even in relation to this argument, Michelstaedter is influenced by Parmenides in particular and by preSocratic thought in general. It is interesting to read a parallel Anaximander fragment: “The Unlimited is the firstprinciple of things that are. It is that from which the coming-to-be [of things and qualities] takes place, and it is that
into which they return when they perish, by moral necessity, giving satisfaction to one another and making
reparation for their injustice, according to the order of time.” – Presocratics, 54.
27
I will return to the importance of “possession” in Michelstaedter’s philosophy in the last chapter.
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constant flux of becoming. In the passage we just quoted, Michelstaedter introduces the figure of
the persuaded individual precisely as the substance, which is free from time and accidents.
The persuaded person does not need the rhetorical connections that delude men to be
sufficient, because he or she possesses all within him- or herself. To be persuaded entails the
negation of one’s relation to determinations: “Persuaded is he who has life within himself, a soul
naked amongst the islands of the blessed” (PR, 11).28 According to Michelstaedter, as a close
reader of Schopenhauer, time brings contradiction into life: everything pretends to be life, while
in fact it is not. “Each thing that lives persuades itself that this continuous deficiency, by which
every living thing dies in continuing each instant, is life” (PR, 14). Time’s flow obliges men to
see the present only in view of the future; doing so, it prevents them from the possibility of
authentic persuasion and timeless being, and it relegates them to the realm of rhetorical
becoming.
In order to possess itself, to reach actual being, it [life] flows in time: and time is infinite, for were
it to succeed in possessing itself, in consisting, it would cease to be will for life;… likewise space
is infinite, for there is nothing that is not will for life…. Life would be if time did not constantly
distance its being into the next instant. Life would be one, immobile, formless if it could consist in
one point. The necessity of flight in time implies the necessity of the dilatation of space: perpetual
mutation, from which comes the infinite variety of things… (PR, 14-15)

As this passage explains, time and space are the conditio sine qua non for the world to be, and
movement and becoming are constituent elements of life. At the same time, time, space, and
movement are also what prevent life from reaching itself: this is the ontological contradiction
inherent in the rhetorical world. Life, by definition, wants itself, and it develops in time chasing
its own fulfillment. But Michelstaedter argues that, if life could reach and possess itself – if it
could consist in a single moment – then this would paradoxically be its negation; it would be
28

The “naked soul” is a famous Platonic figure that appears at Gorgias 523a-524a. The parallel between the Gorgias
and Persuasion and Rhetoric – the theme that constituted the core of my previous work – will be discussed in the
Conclusion.
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death. This argument exemplifies how contradiction is the essence of the rhetorical world. On
the one hand, every living thing lacks itself, and chases its own fulfillment; on the other hand, if
any thing could fulfill its drive, then its fulfillment would also entail its annihilation. If we
understand persuasion as the telos of rhetoric – as the classical tradition conceives it – then
persuasion is impossible. Rhetoric cannot have persuasion as its end, because persuasion is not
sustainable for rhetorical beings, at both the organic and inorganic level.
I know I want and do not have what I want. A weight hangs suspended from a hook; being
suspended, it suffers because it cannot fall: it cannot get off the hook, for insofar as it is weight it
suspends, and as long as it suspends it depends.
We want to satisfy it: we free it from its dependence, letting it go so that it might satisfy
its hunger for what lies below, and it falls independently for as long as it is content to fall. But at
none of the points attained is it content to stop; it still wants to fall, for the next point below
continually overtakes in lowness that which the weight has just attained. Nor will any future point
be such as to render it content, being necessary to the weight’s life insofar, όφρα µένη αυτόν, as it
awaits below; but every time a point is made present, it will be emptied of all attraction, no longer
being below; thus does it want at every point the points below it, and those attract it more and
more. It is always drawn by an equal hunger for what is lower, and the will to fall remains infinite
with it always.
If at some point its will were finished and it could possess in one point the infinite
descent of the infinite future, at that point it would no longer be what it is – a weight.
Its life is this want of life. If it no longer wanted but were finished, perfect, if it possessed
its own self, it would have ended its existence. At that point, as its own impediment to possessing
life, the weight would not depend on what is external as much as on its own self, in that it is not
given the means to be satisfied. The weight can never be persuaded. (PR, 8-9, note omitted)

Persuasion is defined in contraposition to the rhetorical contradiction of life; we have already
seen that Michelstaedter calls it abios bios, “lifeless life,” implying the paradox of a life that does
not seek its fulfillment because it is already fulfilled.
We saw that life wants itself, and the will, as in Schopenhauer, aims to propagate itself;
Michelstaedter develops this conception through his notion of philopsychia: “the love of one’s
own existence.” The God of self-love (philopsychia) – the god of rhetoric par excellence –
flatters men and prevents them from being persuaded. He deludes individuals, depriving them of
the present and flattering them with illusory future goals. According to Michelstaedter there are
two kinds of persuasion: 1) real persuasion, which is constituted in antithesis to rhetoric; and 2)
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inadequate (or illusory) persuasion, which is one of the expressions of rhetorical dialectic.
When humans – because of weakness29 – submit to the flattery of the God of philopsychia, then
they become trapped in the exitless circle of inadequate persuasion and illusory individuality.
Inadequate persuasion is no more than “the will of himself in the future” (PR, 24). On the one
hand, real persuasion negates time, will, and relational subjectivity (what Michelstaedter calls
persona30); on the other hand, time, will, and persona – relational subjectivity and illusory
individuality – are constituent elements of inadequate persuasion.
Inadequate persuasion – illusory individuality – takes shape through the following stages,
which, together, constitute the vicious circle31 of rhetorical living:
1. Something is – Mένει τι
2. Something is for me – Mένει µέ τι
3. There is hope for me – Πάρεστι ελπίς
4. I am sufficient – Αρκω.32
These four stages represent the dynamic through which human beings infer their substantiality.
In the first stage (1), we have the recognition of a certain object, which exists independent of the
subject. In the second (2), the subject identifies the object as what will fulfill its particular desire.
Through the determinate fulfillment (3), humans infer that their desires will always be fulfilled in
the future, and thus (4), they also infer their own self-sufficiency. We can say that humans first
abstract relational data from the cycle of perpetual becoming, and then believe that the results of
their abstractions are objects in themselves. Through this process, subject and object are created.
29

“Thus in life do the weak adapt” (PR, 34).
“Michelstaedter’s use of the Italian persona hovers between the modern sense of ‘person’ and the ancient
designation of ‘speaking role’” (PR, xxvi). We may read Michelstaedter’s persona as both relational and illusory
subjectivity.
31
These four stages are graphically represented in a circle at Persuasion and Rhetoric, 23.
32
“This is the exitless circle of illusory individuality, which affirms a persona, an end, a reason: inadequate
persuasion” (PR, 23).
30
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Objects appear to humans as “available,” and in this way, they are interpreted as what can fulfill
human desires. What was previously abstracted is now re-situated in the relation of “needs.” This
entails that people see themselves as capable of desiring in the future (as they are in the present);
they also need to imagine their desires fulfilled in the future (as they also are in the present);
from these two assumptions, humans infer their self-sufficiency. This kind of persuasion is
logically inadequate, because it takes place in accordance with the rhetorical world, which
contradicts the incontrovertible onto-logical truth of Parmenidean being. Nevertheless,
inadequate persuasion is adequate to the world that it affirms; it “is adequate only to the world it
creates for itself” (PR, 23). In the rhetorical world only illusory individuality is possible.
At this point in his analysis, Michelstaedter introduces the rhetorical dialectic of pleasure
and pain. We said that philopsychia, which seduces, flatters, and deludes human beings, is a
fundamental aspect of rhetoric. There is another important element in the rhetorical world, which
works in the opposite direction: the fear of death. If human beings who are “illusorily persuaded”
want themselves to continue as willing agents in the future, then they are also afraid that their
will might cease in the future. They fear their own annihilation. Since human beings infer their
sufficiency from the fulfillment of their particular desires, humans also see the end of will as
their own end. We may interpret Michelstaedter’s understanding of the dialectic of pleasure and
pain and “philopsychia” versus the “fear-of-death” in the following way:
1. Philopsychia affirms: you are.
2. Fear of death affirms: you are not.33
If we analyze the dynamic in these terms, we can see that philopsychia flatters human beings by
affirming that “you are”; this needs to be considered in relation to the fourth stage of illusory

33

“And once the voice of pleasure, which tells it you are, is interrupted, it senses only the dull, painful murmur, now
made distinct, which says: you are not; and all the while it asks for life” (PR, 32).
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persuasion’s circle, which also expresses human adulation, by claiming “you are sufficient.” On
the other hand, “fear of death” is “fear of being nothing,” thus it is the “fear of not being”;
humans fear their annihilation, which, inexorably, the flow of time entails.
Pain of loss, of a determinate injury, which men believe limited to this alone, is rather terror at the
revelation of the impotency of one’s own illusion; it is a certain accident or malady, a death, ruin,
catastrophe of given, familiar things: but it is mystery that opens the door to the tranquil, bright
room warmed sufficiently for determinate hope, and it sneers: “Now I’m coming, and here you
thought you were safe, and you are nothing.” (PR, 31)

This passage elucidates the dialectic of pain and pleasure that we are examining. It is interesting
to notice how the dichotomy can also be expressed in terms of “illusion” versus “certainty,” and
“potency” versus “impotence.” The dialectic marks an ontological and existential dynamic:
humans are struggling between their sufficiency and insufficiency, between reaching and losing
themselves, between being and nothing. Thus the fear of death is a fundamental element in
Michelstaedter’s description of Persuasion and Rhetoric’s contraposition.34 Its genealogy may be
traced back to Plato’s Apology, which – along with the Gorgias – is an extremely important
influence on Michelstaedter’s views. In the Apology we read: “to be afraid of death is only
another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not.”35 If fear of death defines rhetorical
living, then persuasion is explained in antithesis to such a feeling. In order to be persuaded it is
necessary not to fear death: “He who fears death is already dead” (PR, 39).
According to Michelstaedter, the one who is persuaded must be alone in the desert and
must create everything around him. The figure of the desert is often present in Persuasion and
Rhetoric, and it exemplifies the necessary solitude that characterizes persuaded individuals. The
desert calls to mind certain ascetic and hermetic traditions, as well as biblical imagery. In this
34

“Being born is nothing but wanting to go on: men live in order to live, in order not to die. Their persuasion is the
fear of death. Being born is nothing but fearing death, so that, if death becomes certain in a certain future, they are
already dead in the present” (PR, 39).
35
Apology 29a; compare this to Gorgias 522e.
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respect, we should remember that Christ is one of the examples of persuaded people present in
Michelstaedter’s work: “Christ said it, but they built the church upon it” (PR, 4). The biblical
character of the desert metaphor is thus clear: Christ, in the desert, did not surrender to the
temptations of the devil, and, in this way, he showed himself insusceptible to the flattery of
mundane (rhetorical) adulation and the self-love of philopsychia’s god. Michelstaedter would say
that Christ renounced rhetoric, and thus showed himself to be persuaded, and to be one with
himself. This is an important passage in Persuasion and Rhetoric, because it indicates that, for
Michelstaedter, the Church expresses the “rhetorization” of Christ’s teaching, much as Plato’s
system represents the “rhetorization” of Socrates’ way and life.36 The following is one of
Persuasion and Rhetoric’s most definitive statements: persuasion can neither be constituted in a
system of knowledge nor housed in historical institutions.
At this point in his analysis, Michelstaedter says that the persuaded person withstands the
burden of his pain differently from rhetorical individuals, whose pain and fear lead them to
illusory persuasion via the perpetuation of their desires. The truly persuaded person creates himor herself in order to possess the individual value and live beyond particular determinations. This
particular connotation of the persuaded person seems to confirm the idea according to which
there would seem to be a possibility of real persuasion in the rhetorical world. This interpretation
understands persuasion as a regulative norm that functions as a guide for humans in this world,
which by definition is rhetorical.
If persuasion is an infinite work, an endless path, then the individual will never be able to
achieve it completely, and thus the way to persuasion is already persuasion itself. Many passages
of Persuasion and Rhetoric lend themselves to this tragic reading of Michelstaedter’s
philosophy. I call this reading “tragic” because if persuasion is at the same time necessary and
36

We will discuss this issue in greater depth in the next chapter.
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not-achievable, then the one who aims at persuasion is bound to a destiny of failure. I find this a
controversial and problematic point, and I will discuss it in greater depth in the Conclusion. In
my opinion, the real “tragedy” in Michelstaedter’s thought lies at the communicative level.
Michelstaedter knows that his message is aporetic; persuasion cannot be communicated. Yet he
fights against the destiny of his inevitable failure, and still tries to communicate his persuaded
point-of-view.

On Rhetoric
Now I turn to an analysis of the first two chapters of On Rhetoric: “Rhetoric” and “The
Constitution of Rhetoric.” I will leave out the third section– “Rhetoric in Life,” in which
Michelstaedter describes the rhetorical forms of living in the society of his own day – a section
which, while interesting, I do not consider essential for the purposes of my analysis.
Michelstaedter argues that, since the way to persuasion is an extreme and “impossible”
choice, humans fail in pursuing such a path consistently and descend instead into rhetorical
modes of life: “man wants from other things in a future time what he lacks in himself: the
possession of his own self, and as he wants and is busied so with the future he escapes himself in
every present” (PR, 11). As Michelstaedter explains through the circle of inadequate persuasion,
humans pretend that the objects of their irrational needs are values in themselves; in this way,
they think that they are free, and do not realize that they are enslaved to the rhetorical dynamic of
endless insufficiency.
In the rhetorical world, everything happens according to two principles: fear of death and
philopsychia. Beside them, there is a particular way in which human beings justify the
irrationality of their living: through linguistic and institutional knowledge. Knowing necessarily
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implies the rhetorical splitting of reality into knowledge and life. “[M]an ‘knows,’ which is why
he is always two: his life and his knowing” (PR, 66). According to Michelstaedter, linguistic
knowledge expresses self-knowledge, and self-adulation. The one who affirms “I know this is,”
is actually affirming himself in the face of his own reality: he locates the arbitrary objectivation
of his will outside of himself. The same affirmation – “this is” – expresses not only the will to
power, but also the reification of such a will. Affirming “this is” is equivalent to affirming “I
claim this to be.” Since Michelstaedter believes that consciousness and will are the same, for him
“I claim this to be” means “I want this to be,” which is equivalent to saying “I want myself
claiming this to be.” Any kind of knowledge that refers to a determinate state of things
demonstrates this reification of the will. Michelstaedter argues that if the “correlative” (the
subject of the sentence) that is affirmed in the direct mode – “this is” – were real in itself, and not
just an arbitrary positum, then there would be no need to affirm it. Thus, the direct mode – “this
is” – is already an unconscious expression of the indirect – connective (“connettivo”) – mode: “I
know this is.” The indirect mode makes explicit what the direct mode keeps implicit: linguistic
expressions are self-referential, and the one who speaks is at the same time the speaking subject,
and the hidden logical subject of his or her own propositions. In this respect, “linguistic
knowledge” manifests human self-adulation. What lies behind Michelstaedter’s argument is the
Parmenidean identity of thought and being and of being with itself; this is the ontology on which
Michelstaedter bases his critique of the institution of knowledge in general and of Plato’s
systematic knowledge in particular.
According to this analysis, Michelstaedter defines rhetoric as the inadequate affirmation
of individuality.
[W]hen he says ‘I know,’ ‘he tells others he is alive,’ in order to have from others something not
given to him for his living affirmation. He wants ‘to constitute a persona’ for himself with the
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affirmation of the absolute persona he does not have: it is the inadequate affirmation of
individuality: rhetoric.” (PR 67-68, note omitted)

We saw that human beings pretend to achieve their self-sufficiency, through the
fulfillment of their particular needs (this is the illusory or inadequate persuasion). In a similar
way, humans mistakenly infer their self-sufficiency from institutional knowledge; when they
claim “I know,” humans implicitly mean to say “I am.” This is an inadequate affirmation of their
individuality: through speculation and then reflection upon such speculation (selfconsciousness), humans pretend to infer their substantiality; for this reason Michelstaedter
believes that knowledge is the highest form of human self-adulation. As La Rocca explains,37 in
Michelstaedter’s thought the critique of philosophy is preceded by the critique of language,
which inevitably breaks the implicit unity between humankind and its surrounding world.
According to Michelstaedter, the rise of consciousness cleaves the immediate unity between
subject and object that immediate or practical knowledge38 could guarantee, even if this kind of
knowledge is also what would lead humans to “inadequate persuasion.” In immediate
knowledge, the subject does not have or possess its knowledge. On the other hand, when human
consciousness arises, the organic unity of life is split into subject and object, and the knowledge
that follows from this split becomes separated and independent from life. Knowledge is thus
defined by Michelstaedter as rhetoric alongside of life:
They need “knowledge,” and knowledge is formed. “Knowledge” in and of itself becomes the goal
of life. There are parts of knowledge, a way to knowledge, men who seek it, men who give it, it is
bought, sold, for this much, in that much time, with that much effort. Thus rhetoric flourishes
alongside life. Men put themselves into a cognitive attitude and make knowledge.
But because knowledge is needed in this manner, it is also necessary that there be
demand…. The certain end, the reason for being, freedom, justice, possession, everything is given
them in finite words applied to diverse things and then extracted from those things. If they ask for
life in each thing, for each the response “to this curiosity” of theirs is ονοµα επισηµον, ‘the name
as conventional sign’ (Parmenides). Then rhetoric engulfs like the current of a swollen river on
37
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La Rocca, Nichilismo e Rettorica, 67-68.
Michelstaedter claims that this kind of knowledge is a characteristic of animals and “humble souls” (AC, 181).
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whose bank you cannot maintain your footing without getting swept into the middle. “Give the
devil an inch and he takes a mile,” the saying goes. Indeed getting used to a word is like acquiring
a vice. (PR, 69-70)

Language cannot substitute itself for things or reveal their meaning, since the word is
only a determination of senses that changes with respect to the particular moment and the
particular speaker. The fundamental mistake of rhetoric consists in substituting a presupposed
“substance” to the particular attribution of sensations. Michelstaedter thinks that the language of
un-persuaded people is a camouflage that pretends to reveal a meaning, while in reality it only
maintains the fear of death, hidden yet constant. We could interpret the psyche of the ones who
are illusorily persuaded in the following way: their unconscious is constituted by the fear of
death, and their conscious by the illusion of their individual self-sufficiency.
In the previous passage, Michelstaedter claimed that knowledge becomes the goal of life;
humans think that in knowledge the truth is revealed and the absolute fostered. But to the human
demand for the absolute, knowledge offers instead conventional signs and names that
“intellectuals” apply-to and abstract-from particular determinations: knowledge is related to the
process of onomazein – naming and name-calling. The process of rhetorical knowing consists of
the fixation upon and hypostatization of words, the meanings of which have been established
arbitrarily. As I said before, “knowing” and its crystallization in institutional forms entail the
fundamental split between knowledge and life. But life is prior to any pre-established category.
As we will see in the next chapter, Socrates’ dialectic – or Michelstaedter’s interpretation of it, at
any rate – does not escape from the instances of life: never satisfied, it develops through the
negation of particular determinations, and, like life, it never crystallizes into any form or
category. According to Michelstaedter, the necessity of the absolute has to function as a
regulative norm, since the absolute cannot be offered by any theoretical system. Socratic
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negative dialectic contradicts any form of “Omni-comprehensive” theoretical system: be it
Platonic, Hegelian, or Crocean.
The absolute – I’ve never known it, but I know it in the way the man suffering from insomnia
knows sleep, or the man watching the darkness knows light. What I know is that my
consciousness, whether corporeal or soulful is made of deficiency, that I do not have the Absolute
until I am absolute, that I do not have Justice until I am just, that I do not have Freedom,
Possession, Reason, the End, until I am free and finite in myself, lacking nothing that would
present itself as an end in the future, but I have reasonable end here, now, all in the present. I do
not wait, search, fear, and I am persuaded. (PR, 65-66)

In relation to his discussion of “knowledge,” Michelstaedter criticizes two fundamental notions:
the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of “imitation,” and Descartes’ idea of the cogito (PR, 7072).
In Persuasion and Rhetoric, Michelstaedter consistently demonstrates his opposition to
any philosophy based on Descartes’ Meditations. I will now offer a recapitulation of his critique
of the cogito. According to Michelstaedter, “cogito does not mean ‘I know’; cogito means I seek
to know: that is, I lack knowledge: I do not know” (PR, 71). While Descartes based his
philosophy on the proposition “I think therefore I am,” Michelstaedter believes that founding
knowledge on self-consciousness is an absurdity. He argues that thinking – in Cartesian terms –
is seeking knowledge, since, in his terms, cogitatio means (roughly) “reflection upon.” In this
sense, reflection and the theoretical argumentation that follows from it are expressions of
rhetoric. So “I think” means “I am rhetorically speculating,” hence “I think therefore I am not
persuaded,” ergo “I think therefore I am NOT.” Parmenidean ontology is central in this
argument. Being is one and immutable, and since, for Parmenides, logos and being are the same,
logos itself cannot be based on any movement. Parmenides’ conception of sophia is thus the
negation of mortal opinion, which, by contrast, is based on becoming, and therefore on
movement. According to Michelstaedter, the Cogito – considered in the Cartesian-Husserlian
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tradition – cannot offer the foundations for “secure” knowledge: if cogito means “intellectual
mobility,” and cogito is the foundation of knowledge, then knowledge is based on movement,
and thus it unstable. In this regard, we read:
If thinking means to agitate concepts, which merely by this activity must become knowledge, I am
always empty in the present, and the care of the future wherein I feign my goal deprives me of my
entire being. Cogito = non-entia coagito, ergo non sum, ‘I think = I agitate non-entities; therefore,
I am not.’ (PR, 71)

Michelstaedter also criticizes the concept of imitation – which is fundamental in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s philosophy (mimesis). In the Republic, Plato assesses the notion of “imitation”
negatively, since all imitations are degradations of ideas. By contrast, Aristotle – in the Rhetoric,
Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics – sees “imitation” as one of the principles by which humans,
especially children, learn. Michelstaedter seems to follow Plato’s indications. According to him,
“to follow” does not mean “to imitate,” and the one who wants to follow the way of persuasion
will never find a pre-established path, but only examples of persuasion. As I have said before,
the way to persuasion entails “solitude” and “silence”; the metaphors of desert, solitude, and
silence all point to the individuality and uniqueness of the mode of persuasion. Even if
Michelstaedter offers us examples of persuaded persons, there is no possibility of imitating such
people: being an individual path, the way to persuasion cannot be achieved through imitation of
others, or in any other way. In contradiction of mainstream Christian theology, Michelstaedter
says that even Christ saved only himself:
The first Christians made the sign of the fish and believed themselves saved. If they had only
made more fish, they would have been truly saved because by so doing they would have
recognized that Christ saved himself, because out of his mortal life he was able to create god, the
individual. (PR, 72, note omitted)
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CHAPTER TWO: PLATONIC INTERPRETATIONS

The Critical Appendices – which follow Persuasion and Rhetoric, in an Italian edition
published by Adelphi39 – are fundamental to understanding the genealogy of Michelstaedter’s
main work, since they represent his original thesis project. The Appendices show us how the
author’s analysis of Classical rhetoric represents the starting-point for Michelstaedter’s
philosophy, and that, according to him, “Plato and Aristotle represent two decisive stages of the
word’s absolute dominance over the world.”40 Unfortunately the Critical Appendices have not
been translated into English yet; I will thus refer to the Italian edition.
Even if Michelstaedter’s original thesis project concerned the analysis of the concepts of
persuasion and rhetoric in both Plato and Aristotle, it is only Plato who becomes a continual, if
hidden reference in Persuasion and Rhetoric. Michelstaedter sees in Plato the formation of the
“persuaded” individual, and then the transformation into the “rhetorical” philosopher. In Plato’s
corpus we can find the origin of what Michelstaedter characterizes as “persuasion” – best
simplified by Socrates’ practices as depicted in the Apology and Gorgias – as well as the
beginning of the decay into rhetoric – the systematic thought that, according to Michelstaedter,
begins with the Phaedrus and Parmenides. Aristotle, on the other hand, already stands outside of
any possible persuasion; he is the very philosopher of philopsychia, the first one who
systematized rhetoric, and consequently created a rhetorical system that was intended to
encompass the whole of reality.
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Michelstaedter located the beginning of Platonic philosophy’s decadence in the shift of
perspectives that we see between the “young” dialogues and the “mature” works,41 for example,
the differences of perspective that appear in comparing the Republic to the Apology. For
Michelstaedter, Plato in his later works seems to reveal a certain Aristotelian fascination:
But certainly the last dialogues and especially the Parmenides are pervaded by an Aristotelian
spirit and seem a prelude to the Categories [sic] and the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Of the Platonic
they have no more than clichés. One can also openly say that they were not made by Plato but by
one who had nothing to say and struggled to harmonize the system of ideas with the necessities of
a polymorphous speech…or perhaps the author was Plato himself, though a Plato who was old and
forgetful, or one of his disciples (PR, 84, note).

In contrast to all of this, in Plato’s early dialogues Michelstaedter sees one of the emblems of
Persuasion: Socrates, who is never satisfied with particular determinations, persists, guided by
his daimon, in the search for the One and the Good “in-itself.”
According to Michelstaedter, Socrates symbolizes the unity of life and thought – the same
unity of being and thought that Parmenides’ fragments express. Socrates’ philosophy is the very
opposite of a closed theoretical system; it is based on the concrete dialogical investigation –
which develops through irony and maieutics – and for this reason it presupposes the existential
involvement of the individual. If the individual wants to be persuaded, he or she needs to seek
value, which cannot be expressed by a system of thought, but which has to be pragmatically
achieved through dialogue: “the only power of language is the power of the philosopher’s living
word, which is also his only activity. Any written form arrests concepts arbitrarily” (AC, 246).
Individual value originates only in the concrete encounter between two individualities.
Michelstaedter believes that this “old” Plato, along with Aristotle, abandoned the way to which
Socrates pointed; they detached the faculties of thought from the experiential and existential
41
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dimension of Socratic investigation. Plato, in particular, falsified Socrates’ philosophy, by
offering a systematic version of it; in this way, his representation became falsely rational and
thus, ironically, irrational. According to Michelstaedter, as a close follower of Socrates, it is
only through the dialogue between two subjects that individual value can arise, for individual
value arises differently in accordance with any new conversational exchange.
The “old” Plato forgot or ignored Socrates’ teachings, and submitted to the temptation of
rhetoric. According to Michelstaedter, the difference in intellectual attitude that Plato manifests
in passing from the Gorgias to the Phaedrus is emblematic of the shift from persuasion to
rhetoric, even if the Phaedrus, in many respects, follows and positively develops some of the
Gorgias’ indications. These two dialogues are in fact the particular texts that Michelstaedter
selects, respectively, with which to admire and condemn the Greek philosopher. He believes that
Plato moved away from the creativity and living power of the maieutics of Socrates, and opted
for the apology of his method.
In the Phaedrus, Plato realizes, with unsurpassed efficacy, the value of the Socratic way in relation
to the other people’s impotence; and at that same point, presenting it as finite and considering it,
he stopped. And, since the Socratic way is precisely not a way like any other, because it denies
any closure [fermata] and always proclaims itself unfinished, complacently lingering on it means
abandoning it forever. (AC, 172)

According to Michelstaedter, Plato did not recognize that he had renounced Socratic dialectic by
offering an apology for it: “Phaedrus offers the apology of dialectic – and in this respect it is no
longer dialectical but apologetic; it demonstrates the impotence of any rhetoric in the face of
dialectic – and at that point dialectic is already rhetoric” (AC, 172).
For Michelstaedter, while Socrates’ dialectical way is a method that entails constant care
for the present – what he calls a permanere, or persisting – Plato’s way is a blind “proceeding.”
In contrast, Michelstaedter describes Socrates’ philosophy in this way: “this is the voice of the
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god he has in his breast, the voice that affirms itself in the definitive negation and does not
pretend to offer sufficient values [non finge valori sufficienti] … His life is not a process but a
stasis” (AC, 172-173).
The Platonic system is an artificial “mechanism” that, hiding behind the apparent stability
of empty concepts, re-presents the same movement of rhetorical becoming in a different light.
In his love of liberty, Socrates resented being subject to the law of gravity. And he thought the
good lay in independence from gravity, because it is this, he thought, that prevents us from rising
to the sun.
Being independent from gravity means not having weight, and Socrates did not allow
himself rest until he had eliminated all his weight. But having consumed together the hope of
freedom and slavery, the independent spirit and gravity, the necessity of the earth and the will for
the sun, he neither flew to the sun nor remained on earth; he was neither independent nor a slave,
neither happy nor wretched. But about him I have nothing more to say.
Plato saw this wondrous end of the master and was disquieted. For he had the same great
love, though he was not of so desperate a devotion. So he concentrated on meditating. He had to
find a µηκάνηµα, a ‘mechanism,’ to raise himself to the sun, but, deceiving gravity, without losing
weight, body, life. He meditated for a long time, and then invented the macrocosm (PR, 77-78).

This passage is the beginning of what Michelstaedter calls “an historical example” (PR, 77-84);
here he metaphorically explains how Plato has forgotten Socrates’ teachings and how,
consequently, he was not able to guarantee the stability of being he desired. Socrates’ dialectic
was committed to rational value, the value that is “in itself persuading.” Socratic investigation
advanced through the negation of any particular datum that wanted to be affirmed as a good “in
itself.” Socrates intended to show his interlocutors how the particular examples they were
offering in the dialogues did not represent the goal of their research. According to
Michelstaedter, Socratic questioning about the what was equivalent to asking if something could
be a good or a value in itself and for itself; in Michelstaedter’s terms, this means asking if
something has persuasive value. “Anything that was not a good, a value, it was not a thing for
Socrates, just a meaningless name” (AC, 143).
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The second appendix to Persuasion and Rhetoric is entitled Notes to the Sad Story (“Note
alla Triste Istoria”) and it offers a theoretical explanation of what Michelstaedter describes
metaphorically in the “historical example.” I will use it now in order to develop my analysis of
Michelstaedter’s re-appropriation of Socratic-Platonic thought.
Socrates developed his dialogical investigation through the repetition of the fundamental
question: “ti estin,” “what is it?” With this question, Socrates looked for the “rational value,” i.e.
persuasive value, a value not related to particular opinions. Every time an interlocutor introduced
a certain word or concept, Socrates asked him or her to describe the nature of such words or
concepts. Socrates asked “ti estin,” “what is it (in itself)?” Once the nature of the particular
“estin,” or being, had been analyzed, Socrates could decide whether or not it represented a good
and a value in itself. If it did not, such a being, concept or word was rejected as a meaningless
empty noun.
By contrast, the “late” Plato proposed a set of concepts, the nature of which he had not
previously examined. He assumed categories and concepts, not questioning their nature and not
asking “ti estin.” For Michelstaedter, this particular attitude confirmed that Plato had abandoned
the quest for persuasion, and that he betrayed Socrates’ teachings in order to assume a
speculative position, which is the essence of rhetoric as knowledge. The Platonic system
pretended to deliver things, whereas actually it only talked about things. As his ultimate goal,
“for persuasion in life, [Plato] substitutes this system, which does not give things, but talks about
things” (AC, 144). Michelstaedter understands Platonic philosophy as the attempt to offer
rational dominion, through categories and ideas, over the whole of reality. Since Michelstaedter,
in agreement with Schopenhauer, believes that what we call reality, in its perpetual becoming, is
just the manifestation of the contradictory logic of needs, he also believed that Plato’s attempt to
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fashion a system of knowledge was an act of hubris. Michelstaedter thinks that Plato wanted to
bring the infinite into the finite and offer
the stability of the unstable: the door of the infinite philosophical rhetoric is open – Now
everything is worthy of being said; every relation that is recognized is an idea, since good inheres
in everything, and every idea has a citizenship in the world of the absolute. The way of
abstractions has no limit, nor criterion. (AC, 155)

By contrast, Socratic dialectic did not distinguish between ontological determination and ethicalexistential value; Plato abandoned this equation precisely because, through the process of
abstraction, he opted for theorization and speculation instead.
Here we face a large interpretative problem: how do we combine Michelstaedter’s
critique of Plato’s methodology of abstraction, which sacrifices concrete reality in favor of ideas,
and his critique of the concept of philopsychia, which also belongs to Plato’s philosophy?42
According to Michelstaedter the decisive solution to this problem consists in adhering
completely to Socratic dialectic, which always asks if the particular object of our investigations
is either a good “in itself” or – since tertium non datur – a mere “thing among things.” Plato did
not adhere consistently to Socratic dialectic, because he introduced that “infamous little word”
(AC, 165), kata, which prevents the distinction between relative values and values in themselves.
According to Socrates – Michelstaedter says – if the object analyzed represented a value “with
respect to – kata – our needs,” then it could not represent a value “in itself”; Plato ignored this
fundamental distinction. Nevertheless Michelstaedter insists ironically that it was Plato himself
who pointed out the (Socratic) way to persuasion: “it is not me who teaches these things to Plato,
since if I did not know them – and assuming I know them – I could learn them only from him”
(AC, 165). The Apology and Gorgias are counter-posed to the later systematic dialogues, like the
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Parmenides, Sophist, and Republic; the former works constitute the source of Michelstaedter’s
conception of “persuasion.” As I have said before, the attitude of “not fearing death” derives
from Socrates’ behavior in the Apology, while Gorgias’ myth of “the naked soul” expresses the
same drive of the persuaded person: “that supreme individual necessity of absolute, of liberation
(self ab-solving) from any relativity.”43
For Michelstaedter, the decadence of later Platonic thought became evident when the
system of correspondence between the world of things and the world of ideas reached its most
highly developed articulation. The incorruptible world of ideas, which should have functioned as
a model for the world of things, became a mere reflection of rhetorical relational determinations.
The world of ideas came to be seen as an out-of-time copy of the world of things: ideas were
indeed extraneous to the becoming of “this” world, but only to the extent that they represented
abstractions from becoming itself. According to Michelstaedter, the same ideas that once had
been the criteria for the persuaded person to unmask rhetorical language, in the later Plato came
to represent a system of abstract names that expressed the hypostatization of rhetorical language.
Thus Michelstaedter’s critique of Plato is addressed not to the “Idea” itself, but rather to its
“rhetorical” contamination and degeneration. As Cacciari says, “Michelstaedter’s polemic wants
to ‘save’ the idea from the ‘decay’ into the infinite weave of forms.… The war on metaxy [“the
in-between”] and on dialectical symploke [“form-associativeness”] derives from the necessity of
‘saving’ the idea, in its intuitive im-mediateness … from the modes of correlativity.”44
Michelstaedter wants to save the “idea” from any discursive reduction.
In summary, Michelstaedter criticized Plato for falsifying Socratic dialectic, and
transforming in it into an empty theoretical system. Plato created a system of concepts through a
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process of abstraction: he created categories from the analysis of particular determinations, and
subsequently he forced the whole world of becoming into his system. In this way, Plato forgot
“life” and its instances. With Plato, “world and life become a theory…. Life escaped from
discourse, since in discourse Plato pretended life to be sufficient” (AC, 196). As Pieri notes,
Persuasion and Rhetoric’s judgment about persuasion’s genesis (Socrates) and its rhetorical
overturning (Plato and Aristotle) follows an interpretation of and a reflection upon the modalities
that Greek thought adopted in its philosophical and scientific climax. Michelstaedter identifies the
breaking point in the split between a criterion of knowledge still linked to life’s principles and a
theoretical-scientific criterion elevated to global wisdom.45

We can also see that Michelstaedter’s critique is constituted by two points, which, as we
will see in the Conclusion, seem to move in two different directions. Michelstaedter criticized
Plato (1) for rhetorically corrupting the persuasive idea, and (2) for ignoring the concrete
elements of life. Plato is the first philosopher who separated “knowledge” from “life.” Through
the (mis)use of language, he created a system that contemplated two different worlds: the world
of ideas, and the world of things. The fundamental problem of Platonic philosophy is due first to
the progressive abandonment of the Parmenidean-Socratic way, and second to the institution of a
finite linguistic system that pretended to organize the infinite within words. According to La
Rocca, the “rhetorical” metamorphosis of Platonic philosophy started when Plato organized his
philosophy into a linguistic system, and – for Michelstaedter – any linguistic knowledge
represents self-knowledge, which separates the individual from the immediateness of life.46
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CHAPTER THREE: FAMILY RESEMBLANCES

In the first and the second chapter I have offered an analysis of Michelstaedter’s thought
and a recapitulation of Michelstaedter’s interpretation of Parmenidean, Socratic, and Platonic
philosophy. I will now discuss two philosophical works that are close contemporaries to
Persuasion and Rhetoric: György Lukács’ Soul and Form (1910), and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922).
The present chapter offers an abbreviated discussion of my larger project, which consists
of an analysis of certain philosophical tendencies that were present in the early twentieth century
in what I have called “Middle-European” culture. These tendencies are exemplified by the
common ethos that Cacciari discusses in Interpretazione di Michelstaedter and Metafisica della
Gioventù, the specific interpretations and re-appropriations of pre-Socratic thought, and the
problematic relation between certain intellectuals and more institutional academic knowledge.
In addition to Carlo Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric, and the “young” works of
György Lukács and Ludwig Wittgenstein, my aim in subsequent research will be to analyze the
early philosophical career of Martin Heidegger, the “mature” thought of Georg Simmel, and Otto
Weinenger’s seminal text, Sex and Character. The project will also include a discussion of Søren
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Arthur Schopenhauer.

György Lukács’ Soul and Form
The first edition of Soul and Form was published in Hungarian in 1910, the year of
Michelstaedter’s death; one year later, the book was translated into German. Soul and Form is
considered to be the fundamental work of the young (pre-Marxist) Lukács, and it consists of a
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collection of interpretative essays in which Lukács discusses the poetics of several thinkers, such
as Beer-Hoffmann, Ernst, George, Kassner, Kierkegaard, Novalis, Philippe, and Sterne. The
peculiarity of these essays resides in the fact that they are not just an analysis or criticism of
another author’s thought; instead, Lukács engages in a sort of intellectual dialogue with such
thinkers, and in this way, he interrogates the notions of “soul” and “form.”
The first composition, “On the Nature and Form of the Essay,” is a letter (dated October,
1910) that Lukács wrote in Florence to his friend Leo Popper. Here we meet the crucial
questions of Lukács’ entire project: what is the essential nature of the essay? Is there a specific
form of the essay? Lukács defines the essay as an art form and not a science. “Science affects us
by its contents, art by its forms; science offers us facts and relationships between facts, but art
offers us souls and destinies” (SF, 3). The essay is precisely “an art form, an autonomous and
integral giving-of-form to an autonomous and complete life” (SF, 17). The essay is counterposed to “the petty completeness of scientific exactitude” (SF 17), and to the scientific idea of
objectivity, since it can only express an endless interpretation. This does not mean that the essay
offers a merely subjective reading, because it is also counter-posed to subjective “impressionistic
freshness” (SF, 17)47; the essay is objective to the extent that it aims at the truth, the idea. Like
the lover who aims at the beloved, we can interpret the essayist as a lover, whose love for his or
her subject resembles the Platonic Eros, described in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. “Erotic is
the very nature of the essay’s form.”48
“The idea is there before any of its expressions, it is a soul-value, a world-moving and
life-forming force in itself: and that is why such criticism will always speak of life where it is
most alive” (SF, 16). Lukács’ conception of the essay seems to be the perfect form of mediation
47
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between the idea in itself and the world of flux, change and temporality, while his description of
the essayist’s role reflects the erotic-hermeneutic attitude of the “neo-Platonic” philosopher.
According to Cacciari’s Metafisica della Gioventù, “the ‘conversation’ between the
young Lukács and the already-mature [già compiuto] Michelstaedter needs to be considered
among the most extraordinary documents of contemporary thought that is engaged against
aesthetic culture.”49 Lukács thinks that “aesthetic culture” lacks a center; the aesthetic type is
only driven by his or her impressions, hence nothing is really a thing “in itself.” Michelstaedter –
in his Dialogo della Salute50 – sees the aesthetic world as the world of insatiability [insaziabilità]
and of lack. The aesthetic type thinks that things in the world can fulfill his or her desires, and
also that everything depends upon his or her own efforts. In reality, the aesthetic type is the most
dependent of people: possessed by the objects of his or her own desires.
Lukács thinks that “there are, then, two types of reality of the soul: one is life and the
other living; both are equally effective, but they can never be effective at the same time” (SF, 4).
The dichotomy of life versus living is mirrored in other dualisms: universal concepts, (Platonic
Ideas) versus names and things; and significance versus the image. We may say that, in some
respects, Lukács’ distinction between life and living is very similar to Michelstaedter’s
distinction between persuasion and rhetoric. Moreover, as Lukács investigates the essence of
“life,” he encounters some of the same contradictions that the first pages of Persuasion and
Rhetoric describe. In “The Metaphysics of Tragedy,” the last of Soul and Form’s essays, we
read:
Life is an anarchy of light and dark: nothing is ever completely fulfilled in life, nothing ever quite
ends; new, confusing voices always mingle with the chorus of those that have been heard before.
Everything flows, everything merges into another thing, and the mixture is uncontrolled and
impure; everything is destroyed, everything is smashed, nothing ever flowers into real life. To live
49
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is to live something through to the end: but life means that nothing is ever fully and completely
lived through to the end. Life is the most unreal and unliving of all conceivable existences; one
can describe it only negatively – by saying that something always happens to disturb and interrupt
the flow. Schelling wrote: ‘We say a thing lasts because its existence is not in conformity with its
nature.’ Real life is always unreal, always impossible, in the midst of empirical life. (SF, 152-153)

The similarities between Lukács’ and Michelstaedter’s descriptions of “life” are stunning. In
their analysis, both authors refer to Heraclitus’ claim “πάντα ρει (everything flows),” and think
that nothing can ever be truly accomplished in life. Just as Michelstaedter sees persuaded life as
“impossible,” (abios bios), Lukács claims that real life is always unreal, and impossible to
achieve in empirical reality. Michelstaedter’s persuasion and Lukács’ later notion of goodness51
are cognate ideas; both concepts express the same paradox. Michelstaedter and Lukács discover
“the vanity of forms”; both try “to think beyond them, and to situate thought beyond their
norm.”52 Nevertheless, the nature of the essay as infinite interpretation is what differentiates
Lukács from Michelstaedter, whose notion of persuasion is opposed to any discursiveness, and,
for this reason, opposed to Lukács’ essay. Discursiveness (like any philosophy based on the
cogito) is based on movement and dilatation of time; in Michelstaedter’ view, none of
temporality’s forms can attest to the authenticity of persuasion.53
In the Introduction, I suggested that in both Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric
and Lukács’ Soul and Form something is decided in relation to Platonic philosophy. According
to Lukács, certain essays, like Plato’s dialogues,54 deal with existential questions. Plato was the
greatest essayist in this sense, since he was able to “connect his questions, the most profound
questions ever asked, with life as lived” (SF, 3). For Lukács, the life of Socrates is the life most
51
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typical of the essay’s form – “Socrates always lived in the ultimate questions,” (SF, 13). “The
‘Platonism’ of the young Lukács…originates as the experience of the problem of form.” Saving
the phenomenon in its finitude coincides with saving the idea. According to Cacciari, the only
way to save both the idea and the phenomenon is to understand the latter as an event, [Ereignis].
Cacciari imagines Lukács’ Platonism as melancholic: “Saving the idea is one with seeing the
idea’s distance from its root, seeing the idea mournfully.”55 Lukács’ thought thus encounters a
doubled Platonic problem: on the one hand, he tries to “conceive the idea in the time, gottlos, of
its ‘not-intuitability’; on the other hand, he wants to express the idea in the form of the ought toSollen, in the form of the imperative, as a principle different from theoretical certainty.”56
Therefore the Platonism of the young Lukács is also denoted by a strong neo-Kantian ethical
intonation; his Platonism is both erotic, and ethical.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Michelstaedter interpreted Plato’s corpus as a divided
in a young (persuaded) period and an old (rhetorical) period. He also opted for a “nondiscursive” Platonic philosophy, in order to support his peculiar way of thought. He I think that
Michelstaedter would have agreed with Lukács’ interpretation of Plato as the greatest essayist,
but since the essay is essentially interpretation, it is also rhetoric, and thus Plato, in
Michelstaedter’s view, was probably the greatest of all rhetorical thinkers, which is no
compliment.
Cacciari claims that, despite his preference for discursiveness, Lukács tries to think
beyond forms, and beyond correlativity. He tries to situate certain experiences beyond the level
of linguistic articulation.
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There are experiences, then, which cannot be expressed by any gesture and which yet long for
expression.…I mean intellectuality, conceptuality as sensed experience, as immediate reality, as
spontaneous principle of existence; the world-view in its undisguised purity as an event of the
soul, as the motive force of life…. When a man experiences such things, then everything that is
outward about him awaits in rigid immobility the outcome of the struggle between invisible forces
to which the senses have no access. Any gesture with which such a man might wish to express
something of his experience would falsify that experience, unless it ironically emphasizes its own
inadequacy and thus cancelled itself out. (SF, 7)

Can we consider Michelstaedter’s persuasion – understood as a phenomenon of divination – as
one such experience? What Lukács describes in this passage seems to be precisely the tragic
destiny of the one who is persuaded: persuasion cannot be articulated in (rhetorical) language;
any attempt to describe persuasion would falsify it; and any worldly language is inadequate to
express it. This is another form of Michelstaedter’s soulful aporia.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in German in 1921, and
was published in English in 1922 with a famous introduction by Bertrand Russell. The Tractatus
is considered to be one of the more difficult philosophical works of the twentieth century.
Despite the Tractatus’ scientific rigor and logical structure, scholars from a variety of disciplines
have been engaged in interpreting the meaning of certain propositions. When Wittgenstein’s
work first appeared, it was welcomed with great enthusiasm, especially by the so-called Vienna
Circle; nevertheless many intellectuals – Otto Neurath, for example – were skeptical about the
“philosophy on the ineffable” expressed there. In this section, I will also offer an interpretation
of what the Tractatus possibly points to: what it explicitly does not say, and suggests passing
over in silence instead. The main inspirations for my reading of Wittgenstein are Harrison’s
1910, and Cacciari’s Interpretazione di Michelstaedter; along with these authors, I am aware that

42
the following interpretation is controversial, yet intriguing if compared to Michelstaedter’s and
Lukács’ thought.
According to Wittgenstein, “[t]he world is all that is the case” (1 – TL, 5)57 ; everything
that happens in the world is accidental. In different terms, the world is the totality of facts (not of
objects), a facts is “the existence of states of affairs” (2 – TL, 5), and states of affairs are
combinations of objects (things). Words name objects, and relations between objects can be
expressed in propositional grammar. Therefore the task of language is to describe the world in a
logical way; on the other hand, language cannot explain why the world is how it is and not
otherwise. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wants to draw a distinction between what can and
cannot be expressed with language; at the end of his work he claims that what can be said, must
also be said clearly; by contrast, what cannot be said must be passed over in silence (7 – TL,
89). According to Harrison, this self-limiting of language is the whole sense of the Tractatus.
“The self-professed mission of the Tractatus, then, is to prescribe the proper usage of language –
the limits within which things can be legitimately described.”58
All logical propositions are tautologies – anyone who understands the Tractatus
“eventually recognizes them as nonsensical” (6.54-TL, 89) – and cannot touch the real problems
of life. In his Introduction, Wittgenstein claims: “[i]f this work has any value, it consists in two
things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it… the second thing in which the value of this
work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved” (TL, 3-4).
The distance between language and life, as well as the notion of silence are what link
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to Michelstaedter’s Persuasion and Rhetoric. If Michelstaedter’s
thought and Wittgenstein’s philosophy are at a first glance incompatible, and perhaps even
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opposed to one another, then it is also true that, as Cacciari says, in Wittgenstein’s silence we can
hear Michelstaedter’s attempt to speak. The ontology of the Tractatus is completely different
from Michelstaedter’s framework, and Wittgenstein’s conception of language, if compared to
Michelstaedter’s, is what the latter would call “rhetorical.” The logical language described by the
Tractatus is precisely what Michelstaedter criticizes as the empty process of naming and namecalling. Nevertheless, Harrison says that “in another reading, …the Tractatus appears even more
interested in carving out a space for what cannot be said in propositional language, as though to
preserve it from violation.”59 We may claim that, with respect to life, both Wittgenstein and
Michelstaedter see language as a self-negating vehicle. The following proposition from the
Tractatus seems to express the rhetorical level of language, the tautology of philosophical
thought, and the paradox of useless saying:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond
them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright. (6.54 – TL,
89)

Moreover, in the Tractatus a sense of the ineffable emerges: “There are, indeed, things that
cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (6.522 –
TL, 89). With respect to what is mystical – experiencing that life is, for example – language is
useless, and in Michelstaedter’s terms, strictly rhetorical.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus leaves the reader with silence and with a sense of philosophical
aporia. The one who understands the Tractatus will also recognize its prepositions as nonsensical
and impotent with respect to life. To see the world aright, propositional language must be
transcended.
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CONCLUSION: DIALECTIC, APORIA, AND PARMENIDES’ BEING
Come, I shall tell you, and do you listen and convey the story,
What routes of inquiry alone there are for thinking:
The One – that [it] is, and that [it] cannot be,
Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends the truth)
- Parmenides, Fragment 2.60

It seems that Michelstaedter’s investigation leads to an aporetic conclusion: the human
world and human language are essentially rhetorical, and the entire realm of worldly being
appears to be only manifestation of rhetoric. In a similar way, Parmenides characterizes the
“mortals’ way” as a misinterpretation of “being.” And yet the only alternative that
Michelstaedter offers to Rhetoric – Persuasion – is, if not a contradictory concept, then at least
unutterable and impossible to pursue in this world. Is this truly an aporia, or is it rather the
contradictory moment of a dialectical process? Persuasion and Rhetoric opens with this tragic
claim:
I know I am talking because I'm talking, but I also know I shall not persuade anyone, and this is
dishonesty; but rhetoric αναγκάζει µε ταυτα δραν βία “forcibly compels me to do things”; in other
words, “if you bite into a crabapple, you’ve got to spit it out” (PR, 4, note omitted, emphasis
mine).

As we can see, the dichotomy of “persuasion” versus “rhetoric” appears explicitly at the very
beginning of the book. The one who wants to point to the way to persuasion – Michelstaedter, in
this case – has to use rhetoric in order to express his persuasion. How would it otherwise be
possible to “communicate” persuasion if not by means of language, which is essentially
rhetorical? Hegel might say that persuasion has to pass through its negation – rhetoric – in order
to be communicated. But Michelstaedter does not understand the paradox of Persuasion and
Rhetoric as a moment of dialectical unfolding. It rather seems to be an irresolvable aporia. We
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should remember that, according to Michelstaedter, there are two types of persuasion: illusory
(or inadequate) persuasion and real persuasion. Illusory persuasion is represented as a vicious
circle, through which humans pretend to be sufficient unto themselves. Being a vicious circle,
this kind of persuasion keeps repeating itself, and thus can only lead humans to an illusion of
self-sufficiency. On the other hand, real persuasion is defined in opposition to rhetoric, and thus
as an alternative to it. We can therefore conclude that persuasion (be it illusory or real) cannot be
the synthetic moment of a rhetorical dialectic.
In the second chapter, I offered a comparative reading of Michelstaedter’s thought and
Platonic philosophy. It is important to notice how Persuasion and Rhetoric’s paradoxes recall
aporiai that were already present in several Platonic dialogues. The Gorgias, as I noted,
represents an extremely important influence on Michelstaedter, and one may even claim that
Persuasion and Rhetoric reflects the Gorgias’ arguments directly.61 It seems that this transitional
Platonic dialogue offers the same “conscious” contradiction that Michelstaedter’s work presents:
having to fight words with other words:
Con le parole guerra alle parole
siccome aure nebbiose l’aria viva
disperde perchè pur il sol risplenda –
la qual per suo valor non s’avvantaggia.
Using words to fight with words
since living breath disperses misty auras
so that the sun itself can shine –
of no value to the breath alone.
(AC, 134)62
.

The Gorgias is “unconsciously” permeated with the same problem: the insuperability of
language’s rhetorical status. Socrates exhorts Gorgias, Polus and Callicles to present their ideas
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brachylogically – in a concise way – and not to use macrology – long speeches – or epideixis,63
which are primarily rhetorical techniques. But this same Socrates, in this same dialogue, presents
his thesis with extremely long and flowery speeches; therefore he seems to use the same rhetoric
that he aims to criticize, and through it, to win over his opponents.
So much for rhetoric. But what about the “madness” of persuasion? In the Timaeus we
read:
No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration, but when he receives the inspired
word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep or he is demented by some distemper or
possession. And he who would understand what he remembers to have been said…by the
prophetic and inspired nature…must first recover his wits. But, while he continues demented, he
cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the words which he utters. (Timaeus 71e-72a)

Persuasion negates rhetoric, and yet in order to negate it, it must use rhetorical language.
“Persuasion” is thus affected by the same paradoxes that Plato presents in the phenomenon of
divination: the human being is incompetent to render judgment on his experiences, and thus to
express his or her own experience of persuasion. If it is true that the one who is outside
persuasion – the rhetorical person – cannot communicate it, the same must be said for the one
who is persuaded. On the one hand, “[h]e who does not have persuasion cannot communicate it
… ‘Surely a blind man cannot lead the blind’” (PR, 11, reference and note omitted). On the other
hand, the persuaded person is “alone and distinct among others, for his voice is not his voice, and
he neither knows it nor can communicate it to others” (PR, 11). Michelstaedter suggests that the
persuaded person’s voice “is not his voice”; his voice is the voice of the god he holds in his
breast, a very different god from the god of philopsychia. We may conclude that, rather than
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possessing persuasion, the one who is persuaded is possessed. Plato speaks of mania this way,64
and we might say that it is only as mania – not as episteme – that persuasion can be distinguished
from rhetoric.65
Up to this point, we have examined the aporia that Michelstaedter recognizes as
belonging to his discourse. Nevertheless, he does not seem to be aware of other issues that arise
if we compare his thought to the philosophy of Parmenides, whose conception of being should
function as the ontological basis of Persuasion and Rhetoric. Michelstaedter’s philosophy
pertains to the individual, but, if we want to relate the individual to Parmenidean ontology, then
is not individuality itself a particular determination, and thus separate from Being? How should
we consider the individual in relation to the Parmenidean One? Michelstaedter claims that the
one who is persuaded “must cultivate individual value in the living, and, making his own life
always richer in negations, create himself and the world” (PR, 53). In this sense, how can the
persuaded person, who creates his world ex-nihilo each time, be connected to the totality, which,
according to Parmenides is, has always been, and will always be one and unchangeable?
The persuaded person wants the totality and wants to be one with the totality, but can
totality be something wanted or desired? Do not “volition” and “will” belong essentially to the
constituent terminology of rhetoric? It is worth noticing that in Persuasion and Rhetoric
Michelstaedter conceives the achievement of “Goodness,” or “Justice,” always in terms of
possession and dominion. He often characterizes the figure of the persuaded person as the one
who really has or possesses certain properties or elements. This linguistic tendency cannot be
merely a stylistic choice, and, for this reason, it brings to the surface another problematic aspect
of Michelstaedter’s language choices. On the one hand, he highlights Parmenides’ idea of
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“being” as the fundamental ontology on which “persuasion” is based; on the other hand, he
seems to describe persuasion as the most coherent manifestation/actualization of will to power.
Persuasion is often described as a choice – even if an impossible choice – and rhetoric as a
destiny. In addition to these contradictory tendencies, Michelstaedter describes persuasion as
absolute self-possession, actuality beyond potency, and total dominion, which are all empowered
rhetorical categories. In this respect, I quote Giorgio Brianese, whose work – L’Arco e il Destino
– represents the most coherent “Parmenidean” critique of Persuasion and Rhetoric: “persuasion,
far from being totally ‘other’ than rhetoric, is actually its extreme empowerment, and it maintains
its fundamental characteristics, from which it is not able to escape.”66 In Brianese’s terms,
“persuasion” and “rhetoric” cannot remain two entirely opposed and alternative modalities of
existence, which would symbolize authentic and inauthentic life, respectively. “Persuasion”
differs from “rhetoric” only insofar as it represents the expression of total possession; on the
other hand, “rhetoric” is the inadequate and insufficient manifestation of the will to power.
Michelstaedter decided to open Persuasion and Rhetoric with a quote from Sophocles’
Electra: “I know my behavior is unseemly and becomes me ill” (PR, 1). Why did Michelstaedter
claim that his behavior was unseemly? He knew that his discourse was aporetic, and rhetorical
almost by his own definition. He knew that he could not persuade anyone, because persuasion is
not the end of rhetoric, rather its alternative. He also knew that he had written a non-thesis as his
thesis. And thus Michelstaedter was “ill” – poisoned by rhetoric, because “[r]hetoric is a
phenomenon of poisoning” (AC, 152), and it was rhetoric that forced him to write; “in other
words, ‘if you bite into a crabapple, you’ve got to spit it out’” (PR, 4, note omitted).
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